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Back in 1981, when the rise in inequality over recent decades was barely underway, Sherwin Rosen (1981) wrote a prescient article on "The Economics of Superstars." Rosen argued that technological change, particularly in information and communications, can increase the relative productivity of highly talented individuals, or "superstars." Essentially, such superstars become able to manage or to perform on a larger scale, applying their talent to greater pools of resources and reaching larger numbers of people. Those who are able to do so receive higher compensation.
Of course, other explanations of the rise in inequality have been offered, including arguments that managerial power has increased in a way that allows those at the top to receive higher pay (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) , that social norms against higher pay levels have broken down (Piketty and Saez, 2006) , and that tax policy affects the distribution of surpluses between employers and employees (Saez, 2013) . This paper offers some evidence bearing on these disputes. We first look at differences in occupations in the U.S. across those with the highest income levels. The increase in pay at the highest income levels is broad-based; for example, it is not primarily or solely a phenomenon of publicly traded companies. We also discuss some evidence on the income share of the top 1 percent over time.
We then turn to evidence on inequality of wealth at the top. In looking at the wealthiest Americans, those in the Forbes 400 are less likely to have inherited their wealth or to have grown up wealthy. The Forbes 400 of today also are those who were able to access education while young and apply their skills to the most scalable industries: technology, finance, and mass retail.
We conclude by analyzing which of the different theories are more consistent with the patterns in the data. We believe that the U.S. evidence on income and wealth shares for the top 1 percent is most consistent with a "superstar"-style explanation rooted in the importance of scale and skill-biased technological change. In particular, we interpret the fact that the top 1 percent is spread broadly across a variety of occupations as most consistent with an important role for skill-biased technological change and increased scale. These facts are less consistent with an argument that the gains to the top 1 percent are rooted in greater managerial power or changes in social norms about what managers should earn.
Income Inequality At the Very Top
The increase in pay in the U.S. at the very top is broad-based. It is not solely a phenomenon of one sector, but has occurred for publicly company executives, private company executives, financial executives, corporate lawyers, and professional athletes. In this section, we attempt to understand what professions and forces have driven those increases, using and building on earlier results from Kaplan and Rauh (2010) , Bakija et al (2012) , and Kaplan (2012) .
Evidence on Top Incomes Across Professions
In this section, we report evidence on the increase in pay over time of public company executives, private company executives, hedge fund and private equity investors, Wall Street employees, lawyers and professional athletes. All of these groups have experienced marked increases in pay over the last 20 to 30 years.
We update Kaplan (2012) by reporting time series information on the pay of U.S. CEOs from 1993 to 2011. This analysis tracks the pay of chief executive officers of Standard and Poor's 500 companies from Standard and Poor's ExecuComp database. These are the largest publicly traded U.S. companies. These data also include pay for CEOs of the other companies covered by ExecuComp -companies that at one time have been in Standard & Poor's 1500 index -but are not in the S&P 500. Figure 1 shows "realized" pay-that is, in each year it includes the value of the stock options the executive exercised that year, all in millions of 2010 dollars to remove the effects of inflation. Average realized CEO pay rose sharply in the 1990s, peaked in 2000, dipped by more than 50 percent by 2002, rebounded close to 2000 levels by 2007, dipped markedly again in 2009 and rebounded somewhat in 2010-2011. Average pay in 2011, at $12 million, is 32 percent below its peak in 2000. Median pay fluctuates less, and has a generally upward trend over this period. It peaked in 2006 at a value of just over $9 million (expressed in 2010 dollars). The increase in the median is the result of the increased use of using restricted stock as a compensation tool, rather than stock options. The patterns for non-S&P 500 CEOs are qualitatively similar.
In Kaplan and Rauh (2010) , we compared how well off chief executive officers and other top executives were relative to other top earners. Figure 2 updates this analysis by comparing the average pay of chief executive officers of the Standard and Poor's 500 to the average compensation of US households in the top 0.1 percent from 1993 to 2011. Here we show two different measures: realized pay as discussed above, and estimated or "ex ante" pay, which includes the financial value of stock options when they are granted as opposed to when they are realized. In 2011, the adjusted gross income cutoff for the top 0.1 percent was $1.7 million; the average adjusted gross for taxpayers in the top 0.1 percent was $5.0 million. Because there were roughly 140,000 such taxpayers in this group in 2011, the 500 chief executive officers have only a minimal effect on the average gross income of this group. As the figure shows, actual pay for the CEOs of Standard and Poor's 500 companies has been stable since 1997 at 2 to 2.75 times the average pay of the top 0.1 percent, with the latest figure at 2.5 times and the peaks in 1998 , 2000 . From 1993 to 1996 , realized pay was somewhat lower, at roughly 1.75 times. In other words, S&P 500 CEOs have seen little change in their realized pay since the late 1990s. For chief executive officers of non-S&P 500 companies, realized pay has remained roughly constant since the early 1990s.
One of the arguments sometimes heard about the pay of top executives of public companies is that these executives have too much power to shape a compliant board of directors and thus to gain power over their own pay. In evaluating the importance of this argument, it is natural to look at other groups of highly paid executives who operate under different corporate governance structures and have their pay determined in different ways.
One useful set of comparisons comes from Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2012) , who study IRS tax return data for a number of years between 1979 and 2005. The advantage of the IRS data is that it by definition incorporates the pay of executives from all companies, both publicly traded and privately held. If the governance structure of public companies has played a major role in rising income inequality, then we should see pay rising more for public company CEOs than for private companies. And if social norms have played a strong role, then we should likewise see pay rising more for public company CEOs, as it is the magnitude of their pay that actually sees the light of day in public reports next to their names. The figures showing the pay of private company CEOs is not seen by the general public.
Although the IRS data cannot definitively identify whether the executives in the sample work for private or public companies, nor whether executives are chief executive officers, the data allow for some informative approximations. Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2012) compare executives who receive the majority of their income in salary and wages to those executives who receive the majority of their income from self-employment, partnership and S-corporation related income. They argue that the former are more likely to include public company executives while the latter are most likely to include executives of closely-held business.
The data of Bakija et al show that the pay of closely-held executives has risen substantially as a share of the top 0.1 percent. Pay of closely-held executives comprised 22 percent of the top 0.1 percent in 2005, up from 18 percent in 1993 and 9 percent in 1979. In contrast, the pay of salaried executives, whom they argue are more likely to be with public companies, has actually fallen relative to the top 0. This evidence is not supportive of the arguments that the top incomes have been driven by managerial power or poor corporate governance in public companies. Public company executives, who should be more subject to problems of managerial power problems, saw their pay and relative standing increase less over this period than executives of closely-held company businesses that are, by definition, controlled by large shareholders or the executives themselves and are subject to more limited agency problems. Furthermore, the Bakija et al findings are not consistent with social norms being a large driving factor, as it is the pay of closely-held businesses -where executive pay is private and undisclosed --that increased the most.
Finance professionals are another potentially useful comparison group. Kaplan and Rauh (2010) find that when looking at those with top incomes, finance industry executives are at least as important as public company executives. In the Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2012) data, taxpayers in finance increased from 0.4 percent of the top 0.1 percent in 1979 to 2.0 percent in 2005, or a factor of five times. As discussed in a symposium in the Spring 2013 issue of this journal, the financial sector markedly increased its share of U.S. GDP in the last years.
We can also consider data for financial professionals working in the specific areas of hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds. Since 2001, Absolute Return and Alpha magazine has published an annual "Rich List" of the 25 highest paid hedge fund managers. These estimates include the annual income of these managers from fees and their capital invested in their funds. As a result, these data overstates the income of these managers attributable to their employment per se, as separate from their investment income. Nevertheless, the results are informative.
As shown in the first column of Table 1 , the average pay of these top 25 hedge fund managers was $134 million in 2002. It peaked at over $1 billion in 2007, and was $537 million in 2012 (all in 2010 dollars), standing at almost 116 times the pay of the average AGI of the top 0.1%. In fact, since 2004, the 25 highest paid hedge fund managers have earned more than all of the chief executive officers of the Standard and Poor's 500 companies combined. In 2010, the 25 top hedge fund managers combined earned roughly four times as much as the 500 S&P 500 CEOs. Kaplan and Rauh (2010) document a large increase in fees to private equity and venture capital investors through 2005.
The payments to all but a few of the individuals within these firms are not in the public record. However, the fees received by these firms can be inferred by looking at their assets under management and their profits. We start with the assumption that private equity and venture capital investors earn fees on capital committed to their firms over the previous seven years. Capital raised or committed is obtained from Private Equity Analyst. We assume that the private equity firms earn an annual management fee of 1.5 percent on that capital; while venture capital firms earn a 2.0 percent management fee. In addition, we assume that private equity and venture capital firms receive 20 percent of the profits earned by funds in a given year. Profits are estimated using the average return earned by private equity and venture capital funds in a given year reported by Cambridge Associates.
Using this simple approach, we estimate that the fees for private equity firms have increased substantially over time. Back in the late 1980s, the private equity industry was relatively small, with $1 to $2 billion in annual fees. By 1996-98, it was consistently in the range of $10 billion per year in fees. Lawyers at top law firms also have done very well. Because the law firms are partnerships and their fees are negotiated in an arms-length manner with clients, the pay of partners at those law firms is 1 In an alternative analysis, we assume that private equity firms earn overall fees of 4 percent while venture capital firms earn fees of 5 percent on capital raised over the previous seven years. This assumes that the profit share has a value of roughly 2.5 percent per year for private equity firms and 3 percent per year for venture capital firms. Those assumptions are consistent with the fee estimates in Metrick and Yasuda (2010) . Under this methodology, private equity firm fees have averaged $26 billion per year since 2005. less subject to concerns that managerial power is leading to the increase in pay. The second column of Table 1 reports average profit per partner at the 50 top law firms from American Lawyer surveys from 1994 to 2010. This calculation measures the total partner profits at all of these firms divided by the total number of partners. The average profit per partner provides an estimate of the average partner's average gross income earned from employment at the law firm. The average profit per partner increased from $0.7 million in 1994 to almost $1.6 million in 2010 (in 2010 dollars). The right-most column shows the average partner's income increased from roughly 0.25 to between 0.30 and 0.35 of the average income of the top 0.1 percent. These numbers may understate how well the very top partners at these law firms have done. The number of partners increased over this period from 7,000 to 12,000. If it were possible to compare the pay of the top 7,000 partners in 2010 and 1994, the increase for top lawyers would be greater.
As a final comparison, we also consider pay for professional athletes in baseball, basketball, and football. We extend the analysis of Kaplan and Rauh (2010) by looking at the average pay of the top 25 most highly paid athletes in those sports (every other year) from 1993 to 2011. Figure 3 shows that the top 25 athletes in all three sports average over $15 million per year in salary. Compared to Table 1 , we see that these pay levels are higher than the average of top law partners (in the $1-2 million range), but lower than those of hedge fund managers (in the hundreds of millions of dollars). However, this graph understates the total income of the athletes because it does not include non-salary income such as endorsements. Pay at the top has increased markedly since 1993, with baseball, basketball and football players earning, respectively 2.5, 3.3 and 5.8 (based on 2009) times as much today as in 1993. The greater part of the increase, particularly for baseball and basketball, occurred by the early 2000s.
Again, the key reason looking at these comparisons is because the mechanisms for determining compensation vary quite a bit across executives of public companies, executive of private companies, financial professionals, law firms, and professional athletes. If the reason for growth of incomes at the very top is, say, managerial power in publicly owned companies, then one would expect the increases in income at the top levels to be much larger for that group. The breadth of the occupations that have seen a rise in top income levels is much more consistent with a broad explanation that a combination of information and communications technology, and the ways in which this technology allows individuals with certain skills that are in high demand to expand the scale of their performance, are the primary reason explaining "superstar" pay.
Time Series Evidence on Income Inequality
One of the most widely cited measure of income inequality at the very top is the share of taxable income accruing to the top 1 percent of earners in the economy as tabulated by Piketty and Saez (2003 . As of 2011, the top 1 percent of earners received 19.8 percent of all "market income" (labor income, business income, capital income, capital gains). This measure peaked at 23.9 percent in 1928, fell below 10 percent in the late 1960s and early 1970s, then increased markedly from 1980 to 2000. Since 2000, the share of the top 1 percent has fluctuated, peaking in 23.5 percent in 2007, dipping to 18.1% in 2009 and increasing to 19.8 percent in 2011, roughly the same as it was in 1998 and 1999. These measures of course do not include taxes or government transfers. The Congressional Budget Office (2012) has presented shares of the top 1 percent that include both. In Figure 4 we present all three series since 1979, the first year in the CBO series. This starting point is when the Piketty and Saez measure of the income of the top 1 percent is near its low point. Much can be said about this data, but here, we emphasize two points.
First, while the share of income of income going to the top 1 percent has clearly increased by any of these measures, the long-term extent of the increase is not best-judged by looking at the peaks in 1999 or 2007.
Second, the share of income going to the top 1 percent is quite volatile. In particular, it seems to rise during financial markets booms and then to drop back.
Third, adding transfers and taxes to the picture and using the Congressional Budget Office data, transfer and tax policy appear to be having some effect in restraining the growth of inequality. In the most recent data from 2009, the after-tax, after-transfer income share of the top 1 percent was around the same level as in 1987-1988, 1996, and 2001 .
Background of the Wealthiest Americans
In this section, we look at the Forbes 400 data to gather data on family background. The Forbes 400 is a list of the wealthiest individuals in the US by net worth. It has been published annually since 1982. We collected the lists in 1982, 1992, 2001, and 2011, to In Kaplan and Rauh (2013) , we provide a more detailed description of the list. This section draws on Kaplan and Rauh (2013) and deepens the analysis, particularly in comparing the Forbes 400 in the US to the list of international billionaires, also from Forbes magazine.
For each individual in the domestic and international data sets, we collect and code biographical details, using Who's Who and Internet searches as our primary sources. We identify the founding date of the business that generated the individual's wealth and then determine the generation the individual is in the family of the founder of that business. The normal coding for the generation is an integer. However, if the individual inherited a modest business and built it into a much larger one, we input the generation as 1.5. For example, Edward C Johnson III, of Fidelity Investments, receives a 1.5 in our dataset. Fidelity Investments was founded by the father of Johnson III but primarily built by Johnson III himself.
We separately code the extent to which the individual grew up wealthy, defining three categories: little or no wealth in the family, some wealth in the family, or wealthy. For example, the Koch brothers grew up wealthy. Bill Gates, whose father co-founded a successful law firm, grew up with some wealth, as did, for example, sons and daughters of U.S. Congressmen (Warren Buffett of Berkshire Hathaway), factory owners (James Simons of the hedge fund Renaissance Technologies), newspaper publishers (Philip Knight of Nike), retail owners (Stephen Schwarzman of the Blackstone Group), and psychiatrists (Dustin Moskovitz, a cofounder of Facebook). We view the "some wealth" category as the equivalent of an upper middle class upbringing. Figure 5 shows that in the United States, the share of Forbes 400 individuals who are the first generation in their family to run their businesses has risen dramatically from 40 percent in 1982 to 69 percent in 2011. The inheritance of a small family business and the building of it into a larger business was never very common but represents a trivial fraction of the sample by 2011. Much of the increase in the first generation businesses has come at the expense of the second-generation and third-generation inherited businesses or wealth. The share of fourth, fifth, and sixth generation inherited businesses or wealth has virtually evaporated. These findings are very similar when the results are weighted by wealth. Figure 6 illustrates that the percent that grew up wealthy fell from 60 to 32 percent while the percent that grew up with some money in the family rose by a similar amount. The percent who grew up with little or no wealth remained about flat. Again, these findings are very similar when the results are weighted by wealth.
Overall, Figures 5 and 6 show a trend in the Forbes 400 list away from people who grew up wealthy and inherited businesses towards those who grew up with more modest wealth in the family and started their own businesses. These changes largely occurred between 1982 and 2001. From 2001 to 2011, the percentage of Forbes 400 that started their businesses increased only slightly while the percentage that grew up wealthy declined only slightly. The results therefore point to an increase in wealth mobility at the very top, although the added mobility comes from those who would be considered upper middle class.
Access to education also appears to be of increasing importance. The share of the Forbes 400 who graduated from college rose from 77 to 87 percent between 1982 and 2011. The share of college dropouts (like Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg) also rose from 6 to 8 percent. At the same time, the share of those without any college dropped markedly from 17 to 5 percent. These results are very similar when the observations are weighted by wealth.
We next code industries of the wealth-generating firms into both broad and more narrowly defined categories. The broad categories are industrial, finance/investments, and real estate. Within the industrial category, we further subdivide into 7 subcategories: computer technology, medical technology, retail/restaurant, energy, consumer, media, and diversified/other. Within the finance category, we divide into 4 subcategories: hedge funds, private equity / leveraged buyouts, venture capital, and money management. Combined with real-estate, this leaves us with 12 separate categories. Table 2 documents the industries of the wealth-generating businesses of the Forbes 400 members in each year of our sample. Finance overall grew in representation by around 16 percentage points, technology by 11 percentage points, and retail by 10 percentage points. Energy shrank by 12 percentage points, real estate shrank by 10 percentage points, and the remaining groups that lost share were the nontechnology industrial businesses. The rise in computer technology and the decline in energy is even more pronounced in value-weighted results.
We also create an indicator variable for whether the business had a technology component. Certainly any technology business has a technology component, but being a technology business is not a necessary condition for having an important technology component. Other businesses that we code as having a technology component include pharmaceuticals, energy firms that develop new extraction technologies (such as fracking), financial firms that exploit new technologies (such as online brokerage), and venture capitalists who invest heavily in technology firms. Even in the businesses started by the Forbes 400 that are not computer technology businesses per se, technology has become more important. The share of businesses with some technology component increased from 7.3 percent in 1982 to 17.8 percent in 2011. On a value-weighted basis, the percentage increased from 7.1 percent in 1982 to 25.5 percent in 2011, over one-quarter of the total wealth in the 2011 Forbes 400.
The growth in the technology share occurred largely in the 1990s. The share of computer and medical technologies in the Forbes 400 businesses peaked in 2001 at 15.1 percent, before declining slightly to 14.6 percent in 2011. The share of industries with a technology component rose from 9.1 to 17.5 percent between 1992 and 2001, but only very slightly thereafter. The growth in financial businesses -private equity, hedge funds, and venture capital -on the other hand, occurred primarily in the 2000s, while the share of media, consumer, and diversified businesses declined during that decade.
These findings appear to be consistent with theories of technological change that favors skill in scalable areas (Gabaix and Landier 2008; Kaplan and Rauh 2010) . Entering the elite group of the wealthiest individuals is less likely to be linked to having already grown up rich, but having some wealth still confers advantages, particularly in access to education. The wealthiest individuals increasingly comprise individuals who accessed this education while young and then applied their skills to the industries that turned out to be highly scalable. In these industries, the combination of increasing technology and returns to skill allow for the greatest generation of wealth: finance, technology, and also retail. The findings are less consistent with the rise in inequality being the result of broken corporate governance or cultural changes.
Some of these patterns are reflected globally, but others are not. Figure 7 shows that the share of global non-US billionaires who are first-generation in the business rose by a similar amount abroad as in the United States, and the composition of the declines in the other categories are very similar to the US experience. Strikingly, however, the share of non-US billionaires who grew up without little or no wealth has risen from under 30 percent in 1987 to over 50 percent in 2012, as shown in Figure 8 . The share that grew up with some, but not large wealth has hovered around 20 percent, whereas the share that grew up wealthy plummeted. Recall that while the share that grew up wealthy also fell in the United States, the rise of the poorest group globally as opposed to the middle group in the US represents a major difference. We can only speculate about the sources of these differences, but one possibility is that in the United States there is better access to education when the family has some wealth, and such access is increasingly important to success in the US economy. Table 3 shows the business in which the global billionaires earned their fortunes over time. The technology component has become more important globally, but nowhere has it become as important as in the United States. Computer technology and money management are increasingly represented among billionaires globally, but the category that gained the most is mining/metals. Energy also saw substantial gains globally, whereas it fell in the United States. There is clearly a greater increase in wealth being derived from natural resources outside than within the United States.
With the large improvements in information technology and the substantial increase in value of the securities markets over the last 30 years, skilled individuals can now apply their talent to much larger pools of capital. The changes in the composition of the wealthiest individuals in the U.S. suggests that these trends are shaping wealth more than they used to, while being born to extensive wealth and inheriting family businesses have become less important. Having access to education also has become more important in wealth generation, but it remains an open question what proportion of those gains are due to gains in skill and what proportion are due to improved access to networks.
The rise in the overall college wage premium in the United States may have flattened somewhat in the past decade (James 2012), but our evidence from the identity of the super-rich suggest that the premium for technological skill has continued to rise in the right-tail of wealth outcomes. These findings are most consistent with the frameworks of Goldin and Katz (2010) , in which technological progress widens inequality among skill groups. Over time, this effect might be countered by the continuing broadbased accumulation of human capital, particularly (as pointed out by Acemoglu and Autor 2012) when there are deep interactions between skills and technologies in accomplishing job tasks.
Wealth inequality
Inequality in wealth appears to be more stable than inequality in income. Estimates of household wealth are available in the triennial Survey of Consumer Finances started in 1983, and from a couple of reasonably comparable earlier surveys, like the Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers from 1962. Wolff (2010 Wolff ( , 2012 These calculations may not capture all of the issues. For example, if the top earners have been engaging in notably more tax avoidance or evasion by offshoring taxes (for some discussion, see Zucman 2012), then wealth inequality might be rising without it being apparent in US-based statistics.
If the proportion of total net worth held by those in the top 1 percent has indeed been fairly stable, then how can this pattern be reconciled with the rising share of income going to the top 1 percent? One possibility is that the top earners decreased their savings rates relative to the rest of the distribution. Definitive conclusions about consumption inequality at the very top are made difficult by data challenges. Looking across the income distribution as a whole, Krueger and Perri (2006) argue that consumption inequality has not tracked income inequality, whereas Aguiar and Bils (2011) argue that "income inequality has been mirrored by consumption inequality." However, no study has shown that the top incomes are actually consuming an even larger share of their income, which is what would be required for consumption patterns to be smoothing out wealth inequality.
Another possible reason that wealth inequality has been more stable than consumption inequality relates to the effects of taxation. As shown above, increases in after-tax after-transfer inequality in the top 1 percent have been more modest than increases in the before-tax before-transfer income inequality. If the consumed share of pretax income were relatively constant, this would tend to mute the effect of increases in income inequality on wealth inequality. If this explanation is true, it would tend to weigh against the argument that top earners are bargaining harder because marginal tax rates are lower (as in Saez 2013) . If ultimately the top earners are not keeping more of the fruits of this activity as wealth, this story must be incomplete.
Conclusions
Inequality in pretax income as measured by the income share of the top 1 percent has increased substantially in the US since 1980. The rise in after-tax after-transfer income of the top 1 percent has been more mute, and the current levels are closer to the late 1990s and not so high as in the mid-2000s.
The sources of rising pre-tax inequality have been long debated. Of course, these theories are not mutually exclusive, and will overlap in various ways, but can be a useful shortcut to think about these theories in two broad categories.
In one category, rising inequality is being driven by top earners finding ways to extract additional income. This category includes explanations of greater inequality based on theories of managerial power (Bebchuk and Fried 2004) , social norms (Piketty and Saez 2006a; Levy and Temin 2007) , and how changes in marginal tax rates alter incentives for managers to seek higher income for themselves (Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva 2011) . In many of these theories, top earners obtain rents in the sense that they distort the economic system to extract resources in excess of their marginal products.
In the other category, the increase in inequality has been driven by economic factors that have altered the marginal productivity of certain kinds of labor. This category would include explanations of greater inequality based in skill-biased technological change (Katz and Murphy 1992; Garicano and RossiHansberg 2006; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006; Garicano and Hubbard 2007) , greater scale (Tervio 2008; Gabaix and Landier 2008) , superstars (Rosen 1981) , trade or globalization (Hecksher 1931; Ohlin 1933; Stolper and Samuelson 1941) . In most of these theories, the idea is that top earners have scarce and unique talents that allow them to command a premium due to the increasing value of their talents in markets of increasing size.
Our results tend to support the second broad category of explanations more than the first. For example, one version of the managerial power or extraction hypothesis argues that corporate governance has deteriorated in a way that allows top executives to have increased their compensation substantially (Bebchuk and Fried 2004) . But our evidence suggests that poor corporate governance cannot be more than a small part of the picture of increasing income inequality, even at the very upper end of the distribution. Other groups that do not report to a potentially compliant board of directors, particularly private company executives, have experienced equal or larger increases in their contribution to the top income brackets. Furthermore, the Forbes 400 lists include virtually no public company chief executives who are not founders, or who became the chief executive officer after the company went public.
A related theory of extraction argues that high earners have a greater incentive to extract from lower earners when marginal tax rates are low, because they get to keep a larger share of the returns from this bargaining activity (Saez 2013) . Our evidence that the wealthiest individuals in the U.S. are increasingly populated by technology entrepreneurs is not directly consistent with this, as the fortunes of the developers of new technologies are arguably quite insensitive to the strength of their bargaining against lower wage workers. The fact that the top 1 percent share in the wealth distribution has in fact been much more stable than the income distribution, and that the rise in the share of after-tax after-transfer income held by the top 1 percent has been much less, also suggests that the top earners may have actually not kept as much of these income gains.
Our evidence also is not obviously consistent with those who suggest that the increase in pay at the top is driven by a recent removal of social norms regarding pay inequality. While top executive pay has increased, so has the pay of other groups, particularly Wall Street groups, who are and were less subject to disclosure and, arguably, less subject to social norms. This is particularly true of private company executives, hedge fund and private equity investors.
Overall, we believe that our evidence remains more favorable toward the theories that root inequality in economic factors, especially skill-biased technological change, greater scale, and their interaction. Skill biased technological change predicts that inequality will increase if technological progress raises the productivity of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers and / or raises the price of goods made by skilled workers relative to those made by unskilled workers. For example, computers and advances in information technology may complement skilled labor and substitute for unskilled labor. This seems likely to provide part, if not much of the explanation for the increase in pay of professional athletes (technology increases their marginal product by allowing them to reach more consumers) Wall Street investors (technology allows them to acquire information and trade large amounts more easily) and executives, as well as the surge in technology entrepreneurs in the Forbes 400. Globalization may have contributed to greater scale, but globalization cannot drive the increase in inequality at the top levels given the breadth of the phenomenon across the occupations we study. Tervio (2008) and Gabaix and Landier (2008) analyze assignment models for CEOs in which more able CEOs can add more value to larger firms. In a competitive equilibrium, their models predict that top executives will be paid more as their firms and other firms they can work for become larger, because larger size increases the returns to hiring the more productive people. Tervio (2008) concludes that his model can explain the high levels of CEO pay. Gabaix and Landier (2008) attribute the large increase in pay of chief executive officers in U.S. public companies to the large growth of those companies over time-the typical large U.S. firm increased in market value by four to seven times in real terms from 1980 to 2003. Public companies, financial services firms, venture capital funds, private equity funds, hedge funds, and law firms all have grown larger, in many instances by orders of magnitude. Although the two papers do not seek to explain why firms (and funds) have been able to become so much larger over time, the same technological change that is biased towards skills may have helped firms and funds to become larger during our sample period.
These theories, interacted with the incentive effects of taxes, regulations, and institutions, also help explain why income inequality has not risen as much in other countries such as Sweden and France. While these countries have implemented productivity-enhancing technologies, there has been considerably less direct development of the most profitable new technologies there than there has been in the United States. And while the private equity, venture capital, and hedge fund industries have grown in these places, they have not been scaled up to the extent that they have in the United States. Disincentives related to tax and regulatory policy may have caused both financiers and innovators in such countries to locate elsewhere, in places like London and Silicon Valley. 
